Juristica International

Im Sommer des Jahres 2020 jährte sich der Beginn der Zusammenarbeit unserer Universitäten zum 10. Mal. Die enge rechtswissenschaftliche Kooperation mit gemeinsamen Seminaren von Professoren, Studierenden und Doktoranden nahm im Juni 2010 mit dem ersten vom DAAD geförderten Seminar in Tartu seinen Anfang – ins Leben gerufen von den Professoren Paul Varul, Rainer Hausmann und Astrid Stadler. Für mich war es die erste Reise nach Estland und es sollten noch einige in dieses kleine, aber faszinierende Land folgen. Das erste Seminar wurde unter dem Obertitel „Die Harmonisierung des Europäischen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts” abgehalten und bot auch für die Gruppe von deutschen Studierenden erstmals die Gelegenheit, Estland und einer der ältesten ehemals deutschsprachigen Universitäten in Europa kennenzulernen. Wie auch später waren wir alle vom Charme der Stadt und der Universität begeistert und unsere Studierenden machten die für viele überraschende Entdeckung einer gemeinsamen Geschichte und rechtlichen Tradition.

Es folgten in fast jährlicher Abfolge weitere Seminare, die abwechselnd in Konstanz und Tartu bzw. Tallinn (Konferenzsprache überwiegend Englisch) abgehalten wurden und von dem „Kern“ Irene Kull, Merike Ristikivi, Marju Luts-Sootak, Astrid Stadler und den jeweiligen Nachfolgern auf dem Konstanzer Lehrstuhl von Rainer Hausmann, zunächst Christoph Althammer, dann ab 2014 Michael Stürner und dem Konstanzer Rechtshistoriker (bis 2020) Matthias Armgardt durchgeführt wurden: im Frühjahr 2011 in Konstanz unter dem Titel „Die schwächere Partei – ein wechselvolles Konzept des Privatrechts“; 2013 in Tartu/Tallinn („Handelsbeziehungen in Europa: die Perspektive des Privatrechts und Internationalen Privatrechts“); im Herbst 2014 in Konstanz („Neue Wege zur Harmonisierung des Privatrechts in Europa – Lehren aus dem Einheitlichen Europäischen Kaufrecht und künftige Herausforderungen“); im Dezember 2016 in Konstanz („Privatrecht im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung“); im November 2017 in Tartu/Tallinn („Vergleichendes Privatrecht und EU- Recht“); im Dezember 2018 in Konstanz („Vertrag und Delikt“) und zuletzt im Winter 2019 in Tartu/Tallinn („Personen und persönliche Freiheit im Privatrecht“). Die Veranstaltung im Oktober 2014 wurde ausnahmsweise in größerem Format und unter Beteiligung weiterer Professoren (Burckhard Hess, MPI Luxemburg; Soazick Kerneis, Paris; Nils Janssen, Münster; Pascal Pichonnaz, Fribourg) durchgeführt – wie es sich für das große Thema der Harmonisierung des europäischen Privatrechts gehörte. Die für den Herbst 2020 in Konstanz geplante Jubiläumsveranstaltung war schon genau geplant, wurde aber bedauerlicher Weise wie so vieles in 2020 ein Opfer der Covid19-Pandemie. Die Veranstaltung kann hoffentlich schon in 2021 nachgeholt werden.

Die Seminare waren für die deutschen Teilnehmer immer ein großer persönlicher und wissenschaftlicher Gewinn, da sich immer schnell ein freundschaftliches Miteinander der Seminarteilnehmer einstellte und die Gastfreundschaft der Kollegen überwältigend war. Manche Doktoranden beider Seiten begegneten sich in den Seminaren wiederholt und wir konnten miterleben, wie sie zu erfolgreichen jungen Wissenschaftlern und Wissenschaftlerinnen heranwuchsen. Abgerundet wurden die Veranstaltungen stets auch von Vorträgen der beteiligten Professoren mit aktuellen Einblicken in deren Forschungsaktivitäten. Thematisch waren die Seminare bewusst breit angelegt und erlaubten Präsentationen zu hochaktuellen Themen mit innovativen Ideen der jeweiligen Studierenden und Doktoranden. Dies bot gerade den deutschen Studierenden, deren engmaschiges Studium bis zum Staatsexamen sich in einem eher traditionellen Kanon von Themen und Fächern bewegt, schon in einer frühen Phase ihres Studiums interessante Einblicke in neue und gesamteuropäische Entwicklungen. Themen wie die Digitalisierung, die heute in aller Munde sind, waren dank der Vorreiterrolle Estlands in diesem Bereich schon früh auch ein Thema in den Seminaren, ebenso wie alle rechtlichen Probleme rund um Bitcoins, smart contracts etc., aber auch methodischen Fragen der Rechtsvergleichung und europäischen Harmonisierung. Neu war für die deutschen Teilnehmer/innen insoweit häufig der völlig andere und offenere Blick eines Landes wie Estland auf die Harmonisierungsbemühungen in der Europäischen Union. Sie erfuhren, dass man in Estland aufgrund der wechselvollen Geschichte und einer noch eher jungen Tradition autonomer Rechtssetzung nach Loslösung von der Sowjetunion, deren Teil die Estnische Sozialistische Sowjetrepublik von 1940−1991 gewesen war, viel aufgeschlossener ist gegenüber neuen Ideen und einer Harmonisierung als in Deutschland, wo häufig der Reflex in Wissenschaft und Politik überwiegt, das lieb gewonnene BGB zu bewahren. Ebenso konnten sie darüber staunen, dass es in einem Land wie Estland ohne weiteres möglich war, schon als junge/er Rechtswissenschaftler/in an landesweiten Kodifikationsprojekten mitzuarbeiten und Universität, Gerichte und Ministerien generell einen engen personellen Austausch pflegen und Wissenschaft und Praxis viel enger verbunden sind als in Deutschland.

Die Kooperation mit Tartu ist für den Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft der Universität Konstanz die längste und traditionsreichste Beziehung zu einer ausländischen Universität. In deren Mittelpunkt stehen zwar die gemeinsamen Seminare, aber darüber hinaus besteht auch ein reger Austausch durch Forschungsaufenthalte und wissenschaftliche Vorträge zu verschiedenen Anlässen. Die über die Jahre gewachsenen freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu den Kollegen und Kolleginnen in Tartu sind eine einzigartige Basis, aufgrund derer sich den Studierenden an beiden Universitäten Möglichkeiten bieten, die sie sonst nicht wahrnehmen könnten. Dies alles wäre nicht möglich gewesen, ohne den enormen persönlichen Einsatz von Irene Kull, Marju Luts-Sootak und Merike Ristikivi, aber auch nicht ohne die stets wohlwollende finanzielle und organisatorische Unterstützung des DAAD und unserer beider Universitätsverwaltungen, insbesondere dem International Office der Universität Konstanz. Ihnen allen sei an dieser Stelle ganz herzlich gedankt – auch im Namen aller Kollegen und Studierenden. Am Fortbestand der Kooperation, die auf beiden Seiten auch von den jüngeren Kollegen mit großem Engagement getragen wird, besteht kein Zweifel und wir freuen uns auf den weiteren Austausch.

Keywords:

Ten years ago, the faculties of law of the University of Tartu and the University of Konstanz initiated a project of joint doctoral seminars. The first seminar took place in Tartu on 7–14 June 2010. Since then, joint seminars on private law have been held annually, alternately in Tartu/Tallinn and Konstanz. Professors and doctoral students from both universities, along with some master’s students, have given more than 200 presentations at these joint seminars. Articles have already been published on the basis of several presentations made in the seminar series. Of the doctoral students participating in the seminars, 13 have successfully defended their doctoral dissertations.

Keywords:

legal education; doctoral studies; private law; University of Tartu; University of Konstanz

The article provides a brief overview of the background of the new European Union directive on representative actions for protection of the collective interest of consumers (Directive 2020/1828). It describes the basic elements of the directive and explains the major changes that have occurred since the European Commission issued its Recommendation document on collective redress in 2013. The author highlights the issues of the scope of application of the directive, of legal standing to bring a representative action, of collective settlements, and of the problem of funding for collective actions. This discussion puts emphasis on the need to extend legal standing to individual members of the group and articulates an appeal to national legislatures, particularly in Germany, to be more open-minded towards commercial litigation funding and the establishment of a public access-to-justice fund designed to guarantee the effectiveness of Directive 2020/1828 and its implementation.

Keywords:

Directive 2020/1828; representative action; collective settlement; funding in collective redress

There is an ongoing trend to develop inter-connected or ‘smart’ consumer goods, which either contain digital content (such as software) or use digital services for certain of their functions (as with the navigation system of a smart car). The new Digital Content Directive and Sales of Goods Directive create a legal presumption that the seller of smart goods is contractually liable not only for the tangible item and embedded digital software but also for the inter-connected digital services. However, the article shows that much room remains for party autonomy as express agreement in a sales contract may limit the liability of the seller even for the operating system of smart goods and, thereby, override reasonable consumer expectations. The situation becomes even more complicated when the ‘digital element’ of the goods consists of free and open-source software: in these cases, the ‘separately bought’ digital content does not even fall within the scope of the Digital Content Directive, with the result that the seller is not liable for the digital content under the Sales of Goods Directive and the digital content provider is not liable for it under the Digital Content Directive. Therefore, the article argues that the new contract-law package does not raise the level of consumer protection in respect of smart goods as much as it might initially seem to.

Keywords:

digital content; goods with digital elements; smart goods; consumer sales

The European Parliament has proposed legal personhood for artificial intelligence entities, to ensure honouring of rights and responsibility. The article discusses the question of legal personhood for non-human beings from a legal-historical and legal-sociological perspective. In addition, it examines legal personhood in the modern German legal system and discusses the implementation of a tertium genus for artificial intelligence as proposed by the European Parliament. This analysis leads to the conclusion that introduction of e-personhood would constitute a paradigm shift that blurs the boundaries between humans and machines.

Keywords:

Künstliche Intelligenz; autonome Agenten; Vertragsschluss; Maschinenerklärung; Produkthaftung; Gefährdungshaftung; Tierprozess; Sachprozess; Rechtsubjekt

The EU Digital Content Directive provides for overarching regulation of the supply of digital content and services. In this light, the article presents analysis of how contracts for the supply of digital content or digital services can be qualified under Estonian law. More specific focus is placed on contracts for digital services such as storage in a cloud service or use of Web based software, because it is not entirely clear whether the underlying contracts should be considered some type of contract for use or, rather, some kind of contract for provision of services.

The article examines the distinctive characteristics of particular types of contracts for use and for services, such as the possible object of the specific type of contract at issue and the main obligations of the parties, for purposes of determining whether they are suitable for the supply of digital content or digital services.

This distinction is important for understanding of the directive’s relationship with national law and how existing rules function in conjunction with the rules of the directive. Also, it regulates only certain aspects of contract law, while the remainder of the contractual relationship is determined by national law – such as that pertaining to obligations of consumers and legal remedies available to traders. These rules may differ between contract types.

The article’s analysis is based on comparison of Estonian and German law.

Keywords:

digital content; digital services; law of obligations; contract law; qualification of contracts

The paper presents analysis of the use of online hearings in proceedings before international commercial courts. International commercial courts are not a new phenomenon, with the Commercial Court of England and Wales having been established in London already in 1895. What is new is the increased prominence of such courts over the last six years.

The article focuses on three jurisdictions in Europe: Germany, France, and the Netherlands. The author examines to what extent communication technologies are being used in proceedings before international commercial courts in Europe and also whether – and, if so, how – the COVID 19 pandemic has affected this. The overall finding is that there has been increased demand for video hearings since the beginning of the pandemic, if not earlier. The article is focused primarily on cross-border taking of evidence by means of videoconferencing. In this context, it highlights the changes in the recast of the Taking of Evidence Regulation. The author concludes that the commercial courts presented will most likely not benefit from the recast.

Keywords:

international commercial courts; international commercial litigation; online proceedings; Regulation (EU) 2020/1783; COVID-19 pandemic

Because the digital environment does not recognise national borders and with transactions increasingly taking place across them, an electronic environment that affords interoperability is important for the competitiveness of the European Union. Debate about whether the identification of individuals in the digital environment should be a norm and obligation or, instead, the digital environment should be available as a form of expression of our privacy and anonymity has not waned. Although legal entities act through natural persons, solutions are available whereby a natural person’s e-signature may be replaced in an electronic environment by an electronic seal, or e-seal, of a legal entity. Although the general requirements related to e-seals were established in Estonian legislation already in 2009 and on EU level with the eIDAS Regulation in 2016, the legal meaning of an e-seal has remained unclear in most EU countries, even Estonia, where the uptake of such solutions is widespread.

In light of this context, the article examines in which cases the e-seal of a legal entity could be equal in legal meaning to a hand-written signature or an e-signature of a natural person. Thus, the article addresses challenges visible in Estonian and EU-level legal acts that have left the legal meaning of the e-seal unclear. As some EU member states have declared a legal meaning for e-seals divergences among the regulatory approaches examined lead to issues that erode interoperability and the mutual recognition of e-seals in cross-border transactions, both of which would be expected from a genuine digital single market. From the examples of other Member States, a recommendation that the Estonian legislator amend the private-law acts is offered, with recommended wording that should eliminate the gaps in law.

In private-law transactions, non-compliance with the form requirements provided by law or agreed upon between the parties generally results in the nullity of the transaction. According to the law currently in force, failure to comply with a requirement for a hand written signature (written form) or with equivalent requirements connected with electronic form as provided for by law constitutes non-compliance with a formal requirement. Should the Estonian legislation be changed in accordance with the suggestions presented, paying attention to its level when using the e-seal remains crucial. At the same time, it is important to take into account the purpose of the formal requirement, the actual intention of the parties, and the principle of good faith when deciding on the consequences, whether of the current law or of potential changes. When one is using a tool other than the parties' agreement (be it an e-signature or an e-seal), it is important to consider the purpose of the agreement if wishing to determine the parties' actual intention and analyse the legal entity's behaviour and, hence, whether the transaction has been performed.

Keywords:

electronic seal; legal entity; declaration of intent; eIDAS Regulation

The article deals with the nature and versatile application of the functional method, a tool used in comparative law to examine institutions of the law across jurisdictions. The approach has played a role in projects to render laws uniform and contributed to the modernisation of the German Civil Code. Although the functional method is regarded as the most fundamental technique in comparative law, neither Ernst Rabel nor well-known adherents such as Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz expressed any precise strategy for functional comparative research. The reader is guided through the essential assumptions and the approach of the functional method, on which legal comparativists show the greatest consensus with regard to the following steps: creating country-specific reports, putting the social problem in words (tertium comparationis), and finally conducting a critical valuation of the results found. The paper then presents an overview of the functional method’s practical application, criticisms of it, and modified approaches, culminating in a proposal related to the basic assumptions behind the method.

Keywords:

functional method; comparative law; Ernst Rabel; praesumptio similitudinis; CISG; UNIDROIT

The article represents an effort to determine what the legal meaning of a detailed plan is within the context of the fundamental right of ownership. A detailed plan could be understood under Estonian law as a restriction of the fundamental right of ownership or, alternatively, could come under the legal concept of ‘designing the fundamental right of ownership’. The distinction between these two legal concepts is important because they fall under two separate schemes of legal regulation in light of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, which differ from each other considerably. If a detailed plan and the conditions laid down therein fall under the ‘restriction of the fundamental right of ownership’ legal concept, the detailed plan and its conditions must be compliant with the requirements foreseen by the Constitution for any establishment of a restriction to a fundamental right. This question is still unresolved in Estonian law.
To aid in finding a solution that addresses the main research question, the article presents answers for the following sub-questions: i) what the legal effect and meaning of a detailed plan is, ii) how to understand the legal concept of ‘restriction of the fundamental right of ownership’ and how to distinguish between that legal concept and the other one, and iii) what the scope of the protection of the fundamental right of ownership is in light of public construction law.

Keywords:

Constitution; fundamental rights; fundamental right of ownership; administrative law; construction law; public construction law

A presumption is made in the favour of the possessor of a movable thing that he is the owner of the thing, and likewise it is presumed that a former possessor was the owner during the term of his possession. However, legal presumptions such as those behind the German Civil Code’s §1006, subsections 1 and 2 (or §90 of the Estonian Law of Property Act) are shifting the burden of proof to the other party, the one who is not or was not the possessor of the movable. The paper examines the attendant issues with regard to conflict of laws, with the conclusion that it remains unclear whether legal presumptions arising from possession should be qualified by the lex rei sitae doctrine (per the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code, Article 43, Subsection 1), instead as ‘rights over an object’ (under that article’s Subsection 2), or in line with procedural regulations (lex fori).

Keywords:

legal presumptions; possession; ownership; conflict of laws; lex rei sitae; lex fori

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is, together with its seven principles, designed to function as the cornerstone of data protection in the European Union. Although the GDPR was meant to keep up with technological and socioeconomic changes while guaranteeing fundamental rights, its unclear wording with regard to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has led to uncertainty. Therefore, the development and application of ever new AI systems raises various, as yet unresolved questions. Moreover, the complexity of legal requirements poses the risk of inhibiting AI innovation in the European Union. On the other hand, the GDPR gives Member States certain leeway to regulate data processing by public authorities. Therefore, data protection requirements for AI systems in public administration must be assessed under both the GDPR and national law. Against this backdrop, the article aims to guide the reader through the relevant data-protection rules applicable to AI systems in both the EU and in Estonia.

Keywords:

artificial intelligence; AI; machine learning; data protection; GDPR; information technology law

Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, ob der Zugang zum Recht und zum gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz – sich aus dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip speisender Belang von Verfassungsrang – in jüngster Zeit vermehrt durch marktbasierte Finanzierungsintervention sichergestellt wird und sich dadurch eine weitere Abkehr von der staatlichen Kostenhilfe vollzieht. Die Autorin schildert zunächst die Entwicklung der staatlichen Kostenhilfe in Deutschland, bis hin zur merklichen Reduktion durch das Gesetz zur Begrenzung der Aufwendungen für die Prozesskostenhilfe. Weiter wird beleuchtet, ob im Anschluss daran eine Bedürfnisidentifizierung stattgefunden hat, die Alternativen zu Tage förderte, die dem Zugang zum Recht entgegenstehende finanzielle Hindernisse weiter abbauen. Die Verfasserin bezweifelt, ob dies in einem ausreichenden Maß geschehen ist respektive geschieht. Anschließend werden die neusten Entwicklungen am deutschen Rechtsdienstleistungsmarkt geschildert, die beim Zugang zum Recht eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle spielen. Fraglich ist, ob diese mit dem Rechtdienstleistungsgesetz vereinbar sind, stellt doch das Rechtsdienstleistungsrecht eine der marktbasierten Finanzierungsintervention entgegenstehendes Hindernis dar. Abschließend gilt festzuhalten, dass die Liberalisierungsbestrebungen des Gesetzgebers und jüngst der Rechtsprechung dazu geführt haben, dass das Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz kein unüberwindbares Hindernis darstellt.

Keywords:

Zugang zum Recht; Beratungs- und Prozesskostenhilfe; Bedürfnisidentifizierung der rechtssuchenden Bürger; Liberalisierung des deutschen Rechtsdienstleistungsmarktes; gewerbliche Prozessfinanzierer; Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz

Estonia is one of the few countries where the abstraction principle (Abstraktionsprinzip) is recognised as the basis for title transfer in property law. Derived from the works of Savigny and from Germany’s strong land-register system, it is also among the basic principles of property law in Germany (the foundations of the BGB). In most countries, however, transfer of title is causal. The article describes how Estonia adopted and adapted German legal doctrine and thinking in this important field of law. This path was a long one, even though Estonian law has deep connections to German traditions. Before 1940, Estonia’s most important legal act was the Baltic Private Law Act, wherein the abstraction principle clearly was not recognised and the causal transfer of title formed the grounds in property law. In the Soviet era, though property law was given far less emphasis, the causal approach still served as its basis. When Estonia became independent, in the early 1990s, a new system of property law was urgently needed for purposes of land reform and for implementing the land-register system. German support for preparing the new Law of Property Act along the lines of German law was accepted, and the new law entered into force in 1993. Remarkably, at the beginning of this process it was not certain whether the abstraction principle would get implemented, but it became accepted through almost a decade of case law, and the new laws were later amended such that the principle was – unlike in German law – clearly formulated (in the General Part of the Civil Code). The abstraction principle has been an important part of Estonian property law and legal thinking ever since, firmly established both in legal theory and in case law. This process demonstrates well how a legal transplant from a given legal system can work in another.

Keywords:

property law; abstraction principle; Law of Property Act; land reform; legal history

The jurisprudence and case-law approach of German tort law – and, more broadly, German-school legal thinking in general – has found its way into Estonian case law on torts and into Estonia’s scholarly texts on jurisprudence. From among the catalogue of transplants from German tort law that have reached Estonian law or legal practice, the paper focuses on one whose importance cannot be overestimated: the concept of tort liability based on breach of the general duty to maintain safety. This domain has witnessed remarkable change since the beginning of the 2000s, when an analogous concept of liability was still unfamiliar to many Estonian lawyers. The article examines whether and to what extent the concept of liability based on the general duty to maintain safety has become recognised in Estonian legal practice in the years since. Also assessed is the relevant case law to date, for ascertainment of whether any adoption of an equivalent concept of liability has been successful and, in either event, what problems remain to be resolved.

The importance of this issue extends far beyond that of individual questions: the recognition of general duties to maintain safety affects our understanding of the very structure of tort law, of that of the general composition of tort, and of the connections that link the individual prerequisites for tort liability. Furthermore, this constellation influences our thought in the field of tort law more generally and our approach to the cases emerging in real-world legal practice.

Keywords:

tort law; fault; unlawfulness; general duty to maintain safety

Private limited companies are small, closed companies in which, as a rule, there are few shareholders. Regrettably, conflicts arise between shareholders that cannot be resolved in such a way that the persons in dispute remain shareholders, since protracted litigation reduces the value of the company and may lead to the closing of the business. For resolving such situations, several countries have made provisions in their laws for the possibility of shareholder exit.

Current Estonian law does not provide for shareholder exit. The law regulates only a shareholder’s expulsion, but this remedy is not widely used in practice, since its scope is so limited. This mechanism cannot be used for solving the problems in most cases. There are some other possibilities for shareholder exit, but they are merely theoretical and have not been proved in case law.

A review of Estonia’s company law commenced in 2016, and the working group presented its proposals for amending the relevant laws in 2019. One proposal made by the revision working group was to bring into the law provisions governing shareholder exit. Under the proposals made, shareholder exit would be possible only for a valid reason and as ultima ratio. The right to claim for exclusion of a shareholder is held by any shareholder(s) having at least 50% of the votes. If a shareholder is excluded from the company, the court has to determine the compensation to be paid to the departing shareholder, taking into account the rules on capital maintenance.

Keywords:

company law; Estonian law; minority shareholder; shareholder exit; shareholder expulsion

With aims of protecting trade mark proprietors against commercial practices of third parties that could hinder the use of the trade mark in informing and attracting customers, negatively influence its selling power, or exploit its attractive force, the EU legislator and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) have broadened the protection afforded under trade mark law to cover such acts. At the same time, the CJEU has sought appropriate balance between the exclusive rights of trade mark proprietors and the interests of third parties, in allowing those practices that can be deemed acceptable as part of fair competition. The author argues that, in consequence, EU trade mark law is becoming ever more an EU law of unfair competition with regard to practices that involve the use of trade marks.
The article represents an attempt to explain these developments by looking at specific policy choices and decisions of the CJEU on the protection of trade marks, alongside the wider context of EU law dealing with unfair competition. A key conclusion is that, in light of the lack of harmonisation of unfair competition law in the EU (at least pertaining to practices that affect businesses), the widening of the scope of protection under trade mark law helps to ensure the necessary degree of harmonisation while avoiding a parallel system of protection. When compared to pre-existing EU instruments of unfair competition law that prohibit certain uses of trade marks, this approach provides trade mark proprietors with a more efficient mechanism for enforcing their rights. In the course of elucidating this finding, the article gives the reader an understanding of how EU law addresses the protection of the commercial value of trade marks.

Keywords:

intellectual property; trade marks; EU trade mark law; unfair competition; unfair competition law

The article is intended as a step forward from considering only the noble objectives and positive effects associated with the authorities’ bank recovery and resolution powers, for revealing also the inherent effects of these powers on the possibility of banks fighting back against the powers’ unlawful application. Specifically, while the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) sets out the general rule that, under its regime, a bank should have the right to appeal against authorities’ actions, some of the measures established under the BRRD have a natural effect of greatly diminishing bank managers’ motivation to appeal or even completely eliminate any independent decision-making capabilities. This includes choices of whether to file an appeal. This article shows that the properties or outcomes connected with some recovery and resolution measures specified in the BRRD reduce banks’ right of appeal to a fiction and may leave possibilities for uncontrolled unlawful application of powers by the supervisory and resolution authorities.

Keywords:

BRRD; bank recovery; recovery measures; early intervention; bank resolution; resolution measures

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.

Keywords:

principles of substantive criminal law; principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; European Union criminal law

Two moments proved decisive for the development of the right of peoples to self determination in Russia, related to the Soviet approach in the de-colonisation era, as manifested in the 1966 United Nations Covenants, and Russia’s approach to this right after the 2014 annexation of Crimea: with its annexation of Crimea, Russia, just as the Soviet Union had in 1966, challenged the universality of the right to self-determination. The paper examines theory and practice of the right of peoples to self-determination in Russian context from a historical-legal perspective, to trace the roots of the contradictions found in Russia’s current approach to that right. Aimed at understanding the specifics of the Soviet approach to self-determination and considering the case of Crimea in light of analogies between the past and present approaches to the right, the discussion posits the existence of a link between the Soviet and the Russian approach to self-determination, on the basis of legal ties between post-1991 Russia and the Soviet Union established under the doctrine of state succession or continuity. The article offers support for the hypothesis that the current Russian approach to self-determination resembles the Soviet one in demonstrating legal flexibility characterised by self-interest, hypocrisy, and double standards. This calls for renewed discussion of the influence of Soviet international legal thinking on that of contemporary Russia.

Keywords:

national self-determination; sovereignty; national boundaries; interventions

The paper examines the legality and legitimacy of Belgium’s COVID-19-related restrictions in light of national and international guidelines. Its discussion proceeds from the most vital characteristic of any law-based state: the government being subject to standards of substantive and procedural legality, even during a pandemic. After this, the effect of the crisis on the Belgian Rechtsstaat is examined, with special emphasis on the functioning of the separation of powers and on the unprecedented predominance of the executive power, alongside the legal basis for the latter’s actions. The author concludes that the Belgian measures against the virus’s spread have failed to meet the cumulative requirements of the rule-of-law test. Discussion then turns to the possibly huge ramifications for some wider debates in the field of philosophy of law, both for classic topoi ( such as law and morality or utilitarianism) and for contemporary current debates such as constitutionalism, sovereignty, and juristocracy. In its concluding remarks, the paper raises issues of the unspoken social contract between the people and the state: will the restrictions amid the pandemic go down in history as a singular, unique event or, instead, as a step on the slippery slope toward permanent crisis management in the name of a new sanitary order?

Keywords:

rule of law; Rechtsstaat; judicial review; COVID-19; European Convention on Human Rights